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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/891,093	06/25/2001	Sidney Pestka	PBLI-P08-005	9195
28120	7590	04/15/2004	EXAMINER	
ROPES & GRAY LLP ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE BOSTON, MA 02110-2624			MERTZ, PREMA MARIA	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			1646	

DATE MAILED: 04/15/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

## Office Action Summary

**Application No.**

09/891,093

**Applicant(s)**

PESTKA, SIDNEY

**Examiner**

Prema M Mertz

**Art Unit**

1646

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 23 February 2004.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 18-20, 37 and 38 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 18-20, 37 and 38 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_\_.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. \_\_\_\_\_.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

### **DETAILED ACTION**

1. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 2/23/2004 has been entered.

#### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC 112, first paragraph***

2. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 18-20, 37-38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Applicant is directed to the Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph "Written Description" Requirement, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 4, pages 1099-1111, Friday January 5, 2001.

The instant specification does not provide an adequate description of the genus of mutant cytokine compounds encompassed by claims 18-20, 37-38. In the decision of *The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Company*, 43 USPQ2d 1398 (CAFC 1997), the court

Art Unit: 1646

held that:

To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that "the inventor invented the claimed invention." *Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (1997), *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("(T)he description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that (the inventor) invented what is claimed). Thus, an applicant complies with the written description requirement "by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious," and by using "such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention." *Lockwood*, 107 F.3d at 1572, 41 USPQ2d at 1966.

An adequate written description of a DNA, such as the cDNA of the recombinant plasmids and microorganisms of the '525 patent, "requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties," not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention. *Fiers v. Revel*, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Accordingly, "an adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself." *Id.* at 1170, 25 USPQ2d at 1606.

In the instant application, there is a complete lack of written description for the mutant cytokines because not a single species of mutant cytokine from a diseased cell has been described in the instant specification. Applicant asserts that the specification provides examples of mutant cytokines such as IFN- $\alpha$  (page 9) which is <sup>a</sup> representative embodiment of the claimed cytokine mutant polypeptides and therefore, Applicant argues that it is clear that Applicant was in possession

Art Unit: 1646

of the mutant cytokine polypeptides. Furthermore, Applicants argue that in *Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation Inc.*, 66 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Court determined that there was adequate written description for the claimed invention. However, the *Moba* case does not discuss the biotechnology written description guidelines for recombinant DNA techniques and Applicant cannot rely on such non-biotechnology prior decisions with respect to written description.

Applicant also asserts that as seen in *Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.*, 63 USPQ2d 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the viability of the non-statutory *Lilly* written description rule is on the decline. However, Applicant's assertion is false and judicially unsound. To the contrary the following decisions: *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.*, 68 USPQ2d 1424 (DC WNY 2003) and *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.*, CAFC (03-1304) decided February 13, 2004 <sup>as well as</sup> ~~and~~ *Noelle v. Lederman*, decided January 20, 2004, demonstrate that the *Lilly* decision is alive and well.

In *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.*, a patent directed to method for inhibiting prostaglandin synthesis in <sup>~</sup>human host using an unspecified compound, in order to relieve pain without side effect of stomach irritation, did not satisfy <sup>the</sup> written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112, since the patent described the compound's desired function of reducing activity of enzyme PGHS-2 without adversely affecting PGHS-1 enzyme activity, but did not identify said compound, since the invention consisted of performing "assays" to screen compounds in order to discover those with desired effect. The patent did not name even one compound that assays would identify as suitable for practice of invention, or provide information such that one skilled in art could identify suitable compound. And since the specification did not indicate that the compounds were available in a public depository, the claimed treatment method

Art Unit: 1646

could not be practiced without the compound. The written description requirement must still be met in some way so as to "describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed." *Enzo*, 323 F.3d at 968. The Court further explained that:

[T]he appearance of mere indistinct words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim, does not necessarily satisfy that requirement. . . . A description of an anti-inflammatory steroid, i.e., a steroid (a generic structural term) described even in terms of its function of lessening inflammation of tissues fails to distinguish any steroid from others having the same activity or function. A description of what a material does, rather than of what it is, usually does not suffice. [*Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc.*], 119 F.3d [1559,] 1568 [(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Lilly")]. . . . The disclosure must allow one skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity of the subject matter purportedly described. Id.

*Enzo*, 323 F.3d at 968.

Thus, the Court in *University of Rochester* held that the inventors could not be said to have "possessed" the claimed invention without knowing of a compound or method certain to produce the compound. Thus, the patent constituted an invitation to experiment to first identify, then characterize, and then use a therapeutic a class of compounds defined only by their desired properties.

Therefore, similar to <sup>the claims at issue in</sup> *University of Rochester*, here, the full breadth of the claims fails to meet the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph.

In the *Noelle* case, the claims in the Noelle application were directed to the genus, murine, chimeric, humanized and human forms of CD40CR monoclonal antibody. An interference was set up between the Noelle application and the Lederman patent 5,474,771, which claimed the human form of CD40CR monoclonal antibody. The Court concluded that the

<sup>Patent Appeals</sup> Board made a detailed analysis of <sup>the Federal Circuit</sup> ~~this~~ court's precedent pertaining to the doctrine of written description, focusing on the holding from *Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly &*

Art Unit: 1646

Co. that an “adequate written description of a DNA sequence claim requires a precise definition, such as structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties.” 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Board <sup>had</sup> analogized the DNA claims from Regents to the antibodies in Noelle’s application. Accordingly, the Board held that Noelle’s claims regarding the genus and human claims from the 08/742,480 application lacked written description support in the specification of Noelle’s earlier 07/835,799 application because Noelle failed to describe any structural features of the human or genus antibodies or antigens. In other words, the Board found that the claims covering the genus and human antibodies constituted new matter because they lacked adequate written description in Noelle’s earlier ‘799 application. The Board did not reject the claims, but rather denied <sup>Noelle</sup> ~~them~~ the benefit of the earlier filing date of Noelle ‘799.

The Court in Noelle held that the written description requirement has been defined many times by the court, but perhaps most clearly in Vas-Cath. The court held as follows:

35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a “written description of the invention” which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. The purpose of the “written description” requirement is broader than to merely explain how to “make and use”; the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the “written description” inquiry, whatever is now claimed.

Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (emphasis in original). Thus, the test to determine if an application is to receive the benefit of an earlier filed application is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the applicant possessed what is claimed in the later filed application as of the filing date of the earlier filed application. An earlier application that describes later-claimed genetic material only by a statement of function or result may be insufficient to meet the written description requirement. See Regents, 119 F.3d at 1566. This

Art Unit: 1646

court has held that a description of DNA “requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” Id. (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Therefore, this court has held that statements in the specification describing the functional characteristics of a DNA molecule or methods of its isolation do not adequately describe a particular claimed DNA sequence. Instead “an adequate written description of DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself.” Id. at 1566-67 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171).

Indeed, the court in Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Enzo Biochem II”), stated that “the written description requirement would be met for all of the claims [of the patent at issue] if the functional characteristic of [the claimed invention was] coupled with a disclosed correlation between that function and a structure that is sufficiently known or disclosed.” Also, the court held that one might comply with the written description requirement by depositing the biological material with a public depository such as the American Type Culture Collection (“ATCC”). Id. at 970. The court proffered an example of an invention successfully described by its functional characteristics. The court stated:

For example, the PTO would find compliance with 112, paragraph 1, for a claim to an isolated antibody capable of binding to antigen X, notwithstanding the functional definition of the antibody, in light of the well defined structural characteristics for the five classes of antibody, the functional characteristics of antibody binding, and the fact that the antibody technology is well developed and mature.

Id. The court adopted the USPTO Guidelines as persuasive authority for the proposition that a claim directed to “any antibody which is capable of binding to antigen X” would have sufficient



Art Unit: 1646

support in a written description that disclosed “fully characterized antigens.” Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, at 60, available at <http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf> (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (emphasis added).

Therefore, based on past precedent, the Court in *Noelle* concluded that as long as an applicant has disclosed a “fully characterized antigen,” either by its structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, or by depositing the protein in a public depository, the applicant can then claim an antibody by its binding affinity to that described antigen.

Therefore, the CAFC decisions in *Noelle* and *University of Rochester* are controlling precedents for the claims in the instant case and it is suggested that Applicant visit these decisions. There is no conflict between the *Lilly* decision and the decisions in the above cited cases. Contrary to Applicant’s arguments, the Examiner is not improperly applying a heightened written description standard here. There is absolutely no written description for the claimed subject matter drawn to mutant cytokines encoded by genes from diseased cells, said mutant cytokines differing from one to six amino acids compared to mutant cytokines from non-diseased cells. Therefore, Applicants were not in possession of the claimed mutant cytokine polypeptides.

Applicants are arguing that by virtue of the 6,001,589 patent, drawn to methods for identifying a modified polypeptide, the Patent Office has acknowledged that the methodology is enabled and that since a method of identifying the cytokine is enabled, Applicant’s submit that the cytokine itself is enabled. However, as discussed in the *University of Rochester* decision cited above, just because the method was enabled, does not mean that the instant specification teaches the compounds claimed in the instant application. From reading the method claims in the patent, one of skill in the art would understand what method is claimed but it is clear from

Art Unit: 1646

<sup>581</sup>  
reading the patent as well as the instant application that the inventor had neither possession nor knowledge of the claimed mutant cytokines of the instant invention.

To provide adequate written description and evidence of possession of the claimed genus of mutant cytokines, the specification must provide sufficient distinguishing identifying characteristics of the genus of mutant cytokines. The factors to be considered include disclosure of complete or partial structure, physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics, structure/function correlation, methods of making the claimed product, and any combination thereof. In this case, the specification does not identify any particular portion of the cytokine structure that must be conserved for any of the known as well as still to be discovered cytokines, nor does it provide a disclosure of structure/function correlation. The distinguishing characteristics of the claimed genus of mutant cytokines are not described. Applicant cannot lay claim to subject matter unless he can provide a description of the compound sufficient to distinguish infringing compounds from non-infringing compounds. The instant specification fails to disclose the structure for any of the mutant cytokines claimed and the claims recite nothing more than yet-to-be-discovered mutant cytokines. Accordingly, the specification does not provide adequate written description of the claimed genus of mutant cytokines.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC 112, second paragraph***

3. Claims 18-20, 37-38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Claim 18, line 2, recites "mutant cytokine amino acid sequence" which is incorrect because the amino acid sequence is a characteristic of the mutant cytokine polypeptide. It is suggested that

Art Unit: 1646

the claim be amended to recite "a purified or recombinantly produced mutant cytokine comprising an amino acid sequence...."

Claim 18, lines 3, 6, and claims 19-20, recites, "diseased cell". However it is unclear what the metes and bounds of this term are in the absence of a specific definition for such in the instant specification. The interferon Hu-IFN- $\alpha$ 001 described in the instant specification was amplified from genomic DNA of KG-1 cells, which is a cell line in culture not a cell from a diseased condition (see page 14, lines 10-12). Therefore, it is unclear if "diseased cell" encompasses diseased organ or a transformed cell in culture.

Claim 18, line 4, recites "normal cytokine". It is unclear what the metes and bounds of this term are in the absence of a definition for such in the instant specification. Does the term mean a cytokine which is normal in a diseased cell or a cytokine from a nondiseased cell?

Claims 37-38 are rejected as vague and indefinite insofar as they depend on claim 18 for their limitations.

### ***Conclusion***

No claims are allowed.

### ***Advisory Information***

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Prema Mertz whose telephone number is (571) 272-0876. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday from 7:00AM to 3:30PM (Eastern time).

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Yvonne Eyler, can be reached on (571) 271-0871.

Official papers filed by fax should be directed to (703) 872-9306. Faxed draft or informal communications with the examiner should be directed to (571) 273-0876.

Communications via Internet e-mail regarding this application, other than those under 35 U.S.C. 132 or which otherwise require a signature, may be used by the applicant and should be addressed to [yvonne.eyler@uspto.gov].

All Internet e-mail communications will be made of record in the application file. PTO employees do not engage in Internet communications where there exists a possibility that sensitive information could be identified or exchanged unless the record includes a properly signed express waiver of the confidentiality requirements of 35 U.S.C. 122. This is more clearly


Application/Control Number: 09/891,093

Page 11

Art Unit: 1646

set forth in the Interim Internet Usage Policy published in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office on February 25, 1997 at 1195 OG 89.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the Group receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 308-0196.

  
Prema Mertz Ph.D.  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1646  
March 4, 2004